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TEACHING DECOLONIZATION:
REACQUISITION OF INDIAN LANDS
WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE BOX—AN ESSAY
G. WILLIAM RICE∗

Article 26 of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
provides:
1. [Indian] peoples have the right to the lands, territories and
resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or
otherwise used or acquired.
2. [Indian] peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control
the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of
traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well
as those which they have otherwise acquired.
3. [The United States] shall give legal recognition and protection
to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be
conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land
tenure systems of the [Indian] peoples concerned.1
It has always been about the land.
We, all of us, have been indoctrinated into the mythology by which the
Euro-American settlers of the western hemisphere during the “age of
discovery” granted themselves license to seize the land and dispossess the

∗
Associate Professor of Law, and Co-Director, Native American Law Center, University of
Tulsa College of Law.
1. Report of the Human Rights Council on its First Session to the 61st Session of the General
Assembly of the United Nations (19-30 June 2006), United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, Part II, Art. 26, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/1/L.L (June 23, 2006) [hereinafter 2006
U.N. Draft Declaration]. The Human Rights Council adopts, and recommends that the General
Assembly adopt, the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Id. There has never
been doubt that Indian tribes within the United States are “Indigenous peoples” as that term is
used in the Draft Declaration and other United Nations documents and studies relative to the rights
of Indigenous peoples. The author has, therefore, substituted the term “Indian” for the term
“Indigenous” throughout this piece in an effort to assist in the understanding of how these
developing norms of international law would apply within the context of Indian law. Likewise,
the term “State” as used in the context of international documents related to Indigenous peoples
refers to the United States and not the constituent states of the federal union. The term “United
States” has therefore been substituted throughout for the term “State” in quotations from these
international documents without further explanation or attribution. It should be noted that the
Declaration is an aspirational document except to the extent it or some of its provisions may
become customary law or jus cogens.
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indigenous owners of their property.2 Within that myth, Columbus was a
pious heroic figure, steeped in love of church and sovereign, interested only
in establishing a free trade route to merchants in the far flung dominions in
Asia who were willing and able to freely trade their goods for European
wares.3 To save the souls of these heathen savages, Columbus “sailed the
ocean blue” toward Asia, and accidentally discovered the new world (that
happened to be inhabited by several millions of people).4 Following in the
explorer’s 5 footsteps, intrepid colonists sought religious freedom, and
populated the vacant 6 and inhospitable new world (fed by the native people

2. See generally 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 3-20 (1833).
3. 2 WILLIAM H. PRESCOTT, THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF FERDINAND AND ISABELLA
THE CATHOLIC (1962), available at http://www.fullbooks.com/The-History-of-the-Reign-ofFerdinand-and2.html (referring generally to chapter two); FILSON YOUNG, CHRISTOPHER
COLUMBUS (1906), available at http://www.fullbooks.com/Christopher-Columbus-by-FilsonYoung.html. See Columbus in History, http://xroads.virginia.edu/~CAP/COLUMBUS/col3.html,
and the works cited therein.
4. Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_American_indigenous_
peoples (last visited Sept. 27, 2006). “Estimates of how many people were living in the Americas
when Columbus arrived have varied tremendously; 20th century scholarly estimates ranged from a
low of 8.4 million to a high of 112.5 million persons.” Id. (citing RUSSELL THORNTON,
AMERICAN INDIAN HOLOCAUST AND SURVIVAL: A POPULATION HISTORY SINCE 1492 (Univ. of
Okla. Press 1987)).
5. English explorer John Cabot sailed to what became North America under letters patent
from King Henry VII in 1498, authorizing Cabot
[t]o seeke [sic] out, discouer [sic], and finde [sic] whatsoever isles, countreys [sic],
regions or prouinces [sic] of the heathen and infidels whatsoeuer [sic] they be, and in
what part of the world soeuer [sic] they be, which before this time haue [sic] bene [sic]
vnknowen [sic] to all Christians . . . , and haue [sic] giuen [sic] them licence to set vp
[sic] our banners and ensignes in euery [sic] village, towns, castle, isle, or maine [sic]
land of them newly found.
The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, The Letters Patents of King Henry the Seventh
Granted unto Iohn Cabot and his Three Sonnes, Lewis, Sebastian and Sancius for the Discouerie
of New and Unknowen Lands, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/cabot01.htm (last visited Jan.
2, 2007) (citing RICHARD A. RIDDLE, MEMOIR OF SEBASTIAN CABOT 74-75 (1831)). In return,
Cabot was granted the exclusive right to “[a]ll the fruits, profits, gaines, and commodities growing
of such navigation” less a fifth of the “capital gains” to the king. Id. In 1584, Sir Walter Raleigh
was granted
free libertie [sic] and licence [sic] from time to time, and at all times for ever [sic]
hereafter, to discover, search, finde [sic] out, and view such remote, heathen and
barbarous lands, countries, and territories, not actually possessed of any Christian
Prince, nor inhabited by Christian People, as to him, his heires and assignee, and to
every or any of them shall seeme [sic] good, and the same to haue [sic], horde, occupie
[sic] and enjoy to him, his heires and assignee for euer [sic], with all prerogatives,
commodities, jurisdictions, royalties, privileges, franchises, and preheminences,
thereto or thereabouts both by sea and land, whatsoever we by our letters patents may
graunt [sic]. . . .
The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, Charter to Sir Walter Raleigh: 1584, http://
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/raleigh.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2007).
6. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 142 (1810) (holding that “fee title” being in the
State of Georgia was not inconsistent with “Indian title” being in an Indian Nation).
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during their first winters).7 The innocent descendants of the colonists exercised their manifest ancestral license to conquer the continent from sea-toshining-sea by invading the Indian country in a series of just wars to take
the land from the Indians who were not using it properly and refused to sell
it until forced to do so by brave and honorable federal troops.8
According to the American myth, the governments of the various
Indian Nations made several hundred treaties of peace and friendship with
the United States at the end of those wars, were conquered, and then disappeared.9 The Indians disappeared from history during the last half of the
nineteenth century and were thereafter governed by Congress.10 Indians
have no legitimate claims to land or treaty rights because the treaties are
old,11 because all Indians get a government check,12 and because grandpa
stole their land fair and square.13 Indians somehow lost their right to their
own nations “back then,” and are rich from Casino checks. Besides, it is
morally evil for an Indian or a tribe to be rich and not dependant on the
United States, and it is even less comprehensible that an Indian government
should have any right to tell an American citizen what to do.14 Of course
7. Cotton Mather, D.D., The Story of Squanto, MAGNALIA CHRISTI AMERICANA, available
at http://personal.pitnet.net/primarysources/squanto.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2006). See also
Jamestown Colony, Encyclopedia Britannica Online, http://www.britannica.com/eb/article247837/Jamestown-Colony (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
8. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 288-90 (1955).
9. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379-80 (1886); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 31 (1831) (Baldwin, J., concurring).
10. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 203 (1975); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
553, 566 (1903).
11. At least eleven Indian Nations were party to seven treaties with the United States prior to
the entry into force of the Constitution of the United States. See Treaty with the Shawnees, Jan.
31, 1786, 7 Stat. 26 (at the Mouth of the Great Miami); Treaty with the Chickasaws, Jan. 19, 1786,
7 Stat. 24 (at Hopewell); Treaty with the Choctaw, Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21 (at Hopewell); Treaty
with the Cherokees, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18 (at Hopewell); Treaty with the Wyandots,
Chippewas, Delawares, and Ottawas, Jan. 21, 1785, 7 Stat. 16 (at Fort M’Intosh); Treaty with the
Six Nations (Mohawk, Seneca, Onondaga, Oneida, Cayuga, Tuscarora), Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15
(at Fort Stanwix); Treaty with the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13 (at Fort Pitt). The
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution makes “all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States” the supreme law of the land. The several hundred
additional treaties between the United States and the Indian Nations are younger than the
Constitution of the United States—and we law professors do not ignore that document as “too old
to teach.”
12. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 273-74.
13. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S. 197 (2005). See G.
William Rice, Federal Indian Law Cases in the Supreme Court’s 2004-2005 Term, 41 TULSA L.
REV. 341 (2005).
14. See generally City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. 197; Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001);
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438
(1997); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408
(1989); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435
U.S. 191 (1978); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON : THE REHNQUIST COURT,
INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA (Univ. Minn. Press 2005).
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the United States has the right to boss Indian nations around without their
consent. After all, America belongs to the Americans.
From the time Christopher Columbus contracted with Ferdinand and
Isabella to receive a “fair share” of any plunder he could seize on his
voyages,15 to the contra-constitutional plunder of the lands of the Oneida
Nation last year by the United States Supreme Court, it has been about the
land and its resources. According to the myth, whatever lands, resources,
and rights have been retained by the tribes are really owned by the United
States who “allows” the tribes to share in their use, and whatever is held by
the United States is owned by the United States not to be shared with the
Indian nations.
This mythology, and the politics fueled by self-interests which support
it, are inextricably intertwined with federal Indian law. Others have described the implementation of the colonial regime with respect to the Indian
Nations by the United States and its predecessors, and have sometimes
suggested ways to address the fallout from that process.16 The development
15. The Capitulations of Santa Fe, signed by Queen Isabella on April 17, 1492, belies the
claim that Columbus was sailing for the noble aim of spreading Christianity to the peoples of the
Indian subcontinent in Asia that he hoped to govern (although that may have been part of the
equation). The payment Columbus was to receive is set out as follows:
The things prayed for, and which Your Highness give and grant to Don Cristobal
Colon as some recompense for what he is to discover in the Oceans, and for the
voyages which now, with the help of God, he has engaged to make therein in the
service of your Highnesses, are the following:
Firstly, that Your Highnesses, as actual Lords of the said Oceans, appoint from this
date the said Don Cristobal Colon to be your Admiral in all those islands and
mainlands which by his activity and industry shall be discovered or acquired in the
said oceans, during his lifetime, and likewise, after his death, his heirs and successors
one after another in perpetuity, with all the preeminences and prerogatives
appertaining to the said office . . . .
Likewise, that Your Highnesses appoint the said Don Cristobal Colon to be your
Viceroy and Governor General in all the said island and mainlands . . . .
Item, that of all and every kind of merchandise, whether pearls, precious stones, gold,
silver, spices, and other objects and merchandise whatsoever, of whatever kind, name
and sort, which may be bought, bartered, discovered, acquired and obtained within the
limits of the said Admiralty, Your Highnesses grant from now henceforth to the said
Don Cristobal, and will that he may have and take for himself, the tenth part of the
whole . . . .
Panel Three, Audience at the Court of Ferdinand and Isabella, http://xroads.virginia.edu/
~CAP/COLUMBUS/door3.html. His claim was to have military command, to personally govern,
and to receive his tithe of all the plunder or trade that could be generated as a result of his
voyages. It has been suggested that “[h]is excessive demands for titles, revenues, and other
rewards” was the real cause for the delay in obtaining the approval of Ferdinand and Isabella for
his initial voyage. Panel Two, Departure from the Convent of La Rabida, http://xroads.
virginia.edu/~CAP/COLUMBUS/door2.html.
16. Some of the interesting works in this field include: Carrie A. Martell & Sarah Deer,
Heeding the Voice of Native Women: Toward an Ethic of Decolonization, 81 N.D. L. REV. 807
(2005); Robert B. Porter, Decolonizing Indigenous Governance: Observations on Restoring
Greater Faith and Legitimacy in the Government of the Seneca Nation, 8-WTR KAN. J.L. & PUB.
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of the international law with respect to Indigenous peoples, a term which
includes Indian Nations within the western hemisphere, has also been the
subject of several works.17 Both scholars of federal Indian law and the
international community have raised serious questions which render the
American attempt to “domesticate” the international rights of Indian
Nations suspect.18 This paper will attempt to bring these concepts into
focus in the context of considering the result which should be obtained
when an Indian tribe seeks to regain ownership and control over lands and
resources which have been lost as a result of federal Indian law and policy.
Too many of our students display an acceptance of these myths, and, at
least initially, fail to think critically about its substance, and its consequences. Those familiar with the principles of federal Indian law understand that the source of America’s claim of title to the lands of the Indian
Nations is rooted in the voyages of Columbus, Cabot, Raleigh, and the
others who sailed with the warrant of the English sovereign. This claim
was put into execution by the planting of “colonies” upon the shores of the
western hemisphere by the English, Dutch, Spanish, and French,19 and their
eventual consolidation into English hands. Over the course of approximately two and one-half centuries, the thirteen English colonies which
would form the original United States were created, often through the
purchase of lands from the Indian Nations bordering the colonies.20 After

POL’Y 97 (1999); Robert B. Porter, Decolonizing, and Modernizing New York State’s Indian Law,
63 ALB. L. REV. 125 (1999); Robert B. Porter, A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize
Federal Indian Control Law, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899 (1998); Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
Large Binocular Telescopes, Red Squirrel Piñatas, and Apache Sacred Mountains: Decolonizing
Environmental Law in a Multicultural World, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 1133 (1994); Robert N. Clinton,
Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46
ARK. L. REV. 77 (1993); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard
Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L.
REV. 219. Dealing with similar issues in Africa: Joel Ngugi, The Decolonization-Modernization
Interface and the Plight of Indigenous Peoples in Post-Colonial Development Discourse in Africa,
20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 297 (2002).
17. ANGELA WILSON & MICHAEL YELLOW BIRD, FOR INDIGENOUS EYES ONLY: A
DECOLONIZATION HANDBOOK (2005); S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2004); SHARON HELEN VENNE, OUR ELDERS UNDERSTAND OUR
RIGHTS : EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (1998); MAIVÂN
CLECH LÂM, AT THE EDGE OF THE STATE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SELF-DETERMINATION
(2000); HUMAN RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (Cynthia Price Cohen ed., 1998); INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Sarah Pritchard ed., 1998).
18. Miguel Alfonso Martinez, Special Rapporteur, “HUMAN RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES: Study on treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements between States and
indigenous populations” at Part III, paragraphs 168-244, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/20 (1999).
See generally Clinton, supra note 16.
19. See STORY, supra note 3.
20. See, e.g., New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812).
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the rebellion against their King began, the colonies would attempt to deal
with the Indian Nations that were on their de facto borders.
As early as 1778, the Continental Congress, in its bid for independence
from Great Britain, gained the formal support of the Delaware Nation. The
parties to that treaty pledged perpetual peace and friendship;21 the
Delawares granted colonial troops free passage through their lands and the
aid of “a number of their best and most expeart [sic] warriors as they can
spare, consistent with their own safety” for the purpose of attacking British
forts on the Great Lakes,22 while the United States promised material
support23 and guaranteed the Delawares “all their teritoreal [sic] rights in
the fullest and most ample manner.”24 The parties also agreed to a mechanism where representatives of both parties would try “all infractions . . . by
the citizens of either party, to the prejudice of the other” to their mutual
satisfaction.25 This treaty explicitly recognized the boundary of the
Delaware that had been established by former treaties,26 by providing:
Whereas the enemies of the United States have endeavoured [sic],
by every artifice in their power, to possess the Indians in general
with an opinion, that it is the design of the States aforesaid, to
extirpate the Indians and take possession of their country: to
obviate such false suggestion, the United States do engage to
guarantee to the aforesaid nation of Delawares, and their heirs, all
their teritoreal [sic] rights in the fullest and most ample manner, as
it hath been bounded by former treaties, as long as they the said
Delaware nation shall abide by, and hold fast the chain of
friendship now entered into.27
In 1784, the newly independent United States gained peace from the
Six Nations which had divided on the question of whether to support the
British, the colonists, or remain neutral.28 Article 2 of this Treaty “secured
in the possession of the lands on which they are settled” the Oneida and
Tuscarora who had actively supported the Americans.29 This Treaty also
“secured in the peaceful possession of the lands they inhabit east and north

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Treaty with the Delawares, art. 2, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13.
Id. at art. 3.
Id. at art. 5.
Id. at art. 6.
Id. at art. 4.
Id. at art. 6.
Id.
See generally GREGORY SCHAAF, WAMPUM BELTS AND PEACE TREES: GEORGE
MORGAN, NATIVE AMERICANS AND REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMACY (1990).
29. Treaty with the Six Nations, art. 2, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15.
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of” the boundary line between the parties established by Article 3 of that
Treaty.30 In 1785, a Treaty drew a “boundary line between” the United
States and the lands of the “Wiandot, Delaware, Chippawa and Ottawa
Nations”31 and prohibited citizens of either party from settling on the lands
of the other,32 with certain limited exceptions.
At about the same time, a series of treaties at Hopewell on the Keowee
drew boundary lines between the United States and the Cherokee,33
Choctaw,34 and Chickasaw35 nations. Other treaties during this period
established boundaries between the fledgling United States and the
“Shawanoe nation”36 and reconfirmed the boundary established by the 1785
treaty mentioned above “to the end that the same may remain as a division
line between the lands of the United States of America, and the lands of
said nations, forever,”37 and the parties mutually relinquished and quit
claimed any rights within the territory of the other.38
As the federal Constitution was ratified and entered into force, the
United States continued its practice of agreeing to boundary lines between
itself and the Indian Nations. In 1789, a treaty between the United States
and the Six Nations renewed and confirmed the boundary between them as
established in 1784.39 The language of this treaty provided in part:
The United States having thus described and acknowledged what
lands belong to the Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas and Senekas,
and engaged never to claim the same, nor to disturb them, or any
of the Six Nations, or their Indian friends residing thereon and
united with them, in the free use and enjoyment thereof: Now, the
Six Nations, and each of them, hereby engage that they will never
claim any other lands within the boundaries of the United States;

30. Treaty with the Six Nations, art. 3, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15.
31. Treaty with the Wyandots, Etc., art. 3, Jan. 21, 1785, 7 Stat. 16.
32. Id. at art. 5, 6.
33. Treaty with the Cherokees, art. 4, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18.
34. Treaty with the Choctaws, art. 2, 3, Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21.
35. Treaty with the Chickasaws, art. 3, Jan. 10, 1786, 7 Stat. 24.
36. Treaty with the Shawnees, art. 6, Jan. 31, 1786, 7 Stat. 26.
37. Treaty with the Wyandots, Etc., art. 2, Jan. 9, 1789, Proclamation Sept. 27, 1789, 7 Stat.
28 (providing that the Treaty applied to the Wiandot, Delaware, Ottawa, Chippewa, Pattawatima,
and Sac Nations).
38. Id. at art. 2, 3.
39. The purpose of this treaty was to “renew and confirm the said boundary line in the words
beforementioned, to the end that it may be and remain as a division line between the lands of the
said Six Nations and the territory of the United States, forever” and to reconfirm the other
provisions of the 1784 treaty. Treaty with the Six Nations, art. 1, Jan. 9, 1789, 7 Stat. 33. The
United States also confirmed in the Six Nations’ lands that New York had agreed belonged to
them. Treaty with the Six Nations, Nov. 11, 1794, Proclamation Jan. 21, 1795, 7 Stat. 44.
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nor ever disturb the people of the United States in the free use and
enjoyment thereof.40
Further boundary lines were confirmed or renewed with the Creek,41
Cherokee,42 Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanoes, Ottawas, Chipewas,
Putawatimes, Miamis, Eel-river, Wea’s, Kickapoos, Piankashaws, and
Kaskaskias.43 Representative of these treaties was the treaty at Fort
Harmar:
Article 2. . . . [The Indian tribal parties] do by these presents
renew and confirm the said boundary line; to the end that the same
may remain as a division line between the lands of the United
States of America, and the lands of said nations, forever. And the
undersigned Indians do hereby in their own names, and the names
of their respective nations and tribes, their heirs and descendants,
for the consideration above-mentioned, release, quit claim,
relinquish and cede to the said United States, all the land east,
south and west of the lines above described, so far as the said
Indians formerly claimed the same; for them the said United States
to have and to hold the same in true and absolute propriety forever.
Article 3. The United States of America do by these presents
relinquish and quit claim to the said nations respectively, all the
lands lying between the limits above described, for them the said
Indians to live and hunt upon, and otherwise to occupy as they
shall see fit: But the said nations, or either of them, shall not be at
liberty to sell or dispose of the same, or any part thereof, to any
sovereign power, except the United States; nor to the subjects or
citizens of any other sovereign power, nor to the subjects or
citizens of the United States.44
This practice was continued as other Indian Nations came in contact with
the United States.45

40. Treaty with the Six Nations, art. 4, Nov. 11, 1794, Proclamation Jan. 21, 1795, 7 Stat. 44.
41. Treaty with the Creeks, art. 4, Aug. 7, 1790, Proclamation Aug. 13, 1790, 7 Stat. 35.
42. Treaty with the Cherokees, art. 4, 7 Stat. 39, Proclamation Feb. 7, 1792, July 2, 1791.
See also Treaty with the Cherokees, art. 2, June 26, 1794, Proclamation Jan. 21, 1795, 7 Stat. 43.
43. Treaty with the Wyandots, Etc., art. 3, Aug. 3, 1795, Proclamation Dec. 2, 1795, 7 Stat.
49.
44. Treaty with the Wyandots, Etc., art. 2, 3, Jan. 9, 1789, Proclamation Sept. 27, 1789, 7
Stat. 28.
45. See, e.g., Treaty with the Delawares, Etc., June 7, 1803, Proclamation Dec. 26, 1803, 7
Stat. 74; Treaty with the Saks and Foxes, art. 2, Nov. 3, 1804, Ratified Jan. 25, 1805,
Proclamation Feb. 21, 1805, 7 Stat. 84; Treaty with the Osages, art. 6, Nov. 10, 1808, Ratified
Apr. 28, 1810, 7 Stat. 107; Treaty with the Ottoes, Etc., art. 1, Oct. 15, 1836, Proclamation Feb.
15, 1837, 7 Stat. 524. It is interesting to note that the United States even entered into a treaty with
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Putting aside, then, for the moment, any understandings, claims, or
obligations which might have existed between the European potentates and
the newly independent former colonies, it could be fairly said that, while
Europe had planted its plantations and colonies in North America, most
Indian Nations were not colonized. First, Indian Nations did not consent to
the doctrine of discovery as propounded by the Europeans and their
successors, and so cannot in equity and good conscience be bound by its
claims.46 Justice Marshall agreed:
[The discovery doctrine] regulated the right given by discovery
among the European discoverers; but could not affect the rights of
those already in possession, either as aboriginal occupants, or as
occupants by virtue of a discovery made before the memory of
man. It gave the exclusive right to purchase, but did not found that
right on a denial of the right of the possessor to sell.47
The extravagant and absurd idea, that the feeble settlements made
on the sea coast, or the companies under whom they were made,
acquired legitimate power by [the King’s charters to the colonies]
to govern the [native] people, or occupy the lands from sea to sea,
did not enter the mind of any man. They were well understood to
convey the title which, according to the common law of European
sovereigns respecting America, they might rightfully convey, and
no more.48
Secondly, the English claimed that they acquired their rights from the
Indian Nations to the specific territory they actually occupied by purchase,
or by the sword, not through any claim of discovery. In other words, while
the English claim of discovery may have been used to deny the right of the
French, Dutch, Spanish or other European sovereign to accept transferred
lands from an Indian Nation, as between the British and the Indian Nation,
lands were transferred from the Indian Nations to the British only by

Indian Nations in Canada. Treaty with the Seven Nations of Canada, May 31, 1796, Proclamation
Jan. 1, 1797, 7 Stat. 55.
46. No apology is intended for the racist attitudes that invented this theory or denied
complete Indian dominion and ownership of Indian lands, because Europeans (and then the
Americans) believed themselves to be entitled to take whatever others had if they could, but
define that other as inferior.
47. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 544 (1832). From the viewpoint of the
Indian Nations, the doctrine of discovery first used by the European colonizers, and then
incorporated into American law by the Supreme Court in the early cases of Johnson v. M’Intosh,
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); and
Worcester is inapplicable and inadmissible.
48. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 544-45.
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purchase or war—not through a claim of discovery. In his Commentaries
on the Laws of England, Blackstone stated:
[I]t is held, that if an uninhabited country be discovered and
planted by English subjects, all the English laws are immediately
there in force. . . . . But in conquered or ceded countries, that have
already laws of their own, the king may indeed alter or change
those laws, but, till he does actually change them, the antient [sic]
laws of the country remain, unless such as are against the law of
God, as in the case of an infidel country.
Our American Plantations are principally of this latter sort, being
obtained in the last century either by right of conquest and driving
out the natives, (with what natural justice I shall not at present
inquire,) or by treaties. And, therefore, the common law of
England, as such, has no allowance or authority there; they being
no part of the mother country, but distinct, though dependent
dominions.49
Third, as shown by the various treaties referred to above, the demarcation
of the lands of the United States from those of the Indian Nations were
repeatedly and conclusively stated as the establishment of boundaries between the lands of the two sovereigns.50 Repeated declarations of boundaries of division, coupled with solemn guarantees of territorial integrity, and
disclaimers of right to the lands of the Indian Nations seems conclusive in
law as between the United States and the Indian Nations. Finally, some
fifty years on, the Supreme Court would state with assurance that Indian
Nations constituted States (in the International law sense) which are separate and distinct from the United States and its several constituent states:
. . . . So much of the argument as was intended to prove the
character of the Cherokees as a state, as a distinct political society,
separated from others, capable of managing its own affairs and
governing itself, has, in the opinion of a majority of the judges,
been completely successful. They have been uniformly treated as
a state from the settlement of our country. The numerous treaties
made with them by the United States recognize them as a people
capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, of being
responsible in their political character for any violation of their

49. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 104-05 (1765)
(citations omitted). Justice Sir William Blackstone, QC, was the Vinerian Professor of Law at
Oxford, member of the English Parliament, and Solicitor General to the Queen. Id.
50. See supra notes 23-47 and accompanying text.
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engagements, or for any aggression committed on the citizens of
the United States by any individual of their community. Laws
have been enacted in the spirit of these treaties. The acts of our
government plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as a state, and
the courts are bound by those acts.
....
The counsel have shown conclusively that they are not a state of
the union, and have insisted that individually they are aliens, not
owing allegiance to the United States. An aggregate of aliens
composing a state must, they say, be a foreign state; each individual being foreign, the whole must be foreign.51
Finally, the Court would rule within the year that:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct,
independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible
power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other
European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the
particular region claimed: and this was a restriction which those
European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the
Indians. The very term “nation,” so generally applied to them,
means “a people distinct from others.” The constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to be the
supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous
treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank
among those powers who are capable of making treaties. The
words “treaty” and “nation” are words of our own language,
selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well understood meaning. We
have applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to the other
nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense.52
And that:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the
laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of
Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the

51. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
52. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832).
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Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the
acts of congress. The whole intercourse between the United States
and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the
government of the United States.53
So here we are Anno Domini 1832. About two hundred fifty years
after the first English colonies were planted in the western hemisphere, and
fifty years after the American Revolution, Indian Nations are explicitly
recognized as separate States (nations) in the international law sense in
which that term is used. They are recognized as having the right and power
to engage in international relations like any other State.54 Their citizens, in
their individual capacity, are considered aliens to the United States.55 In
their political capacity, they constitute “a state, as a distinct political
society, separated from others, capable of managing its own affairs and
governing itself . . . .”56 Finally, they occupy their own territory whose
integrity is guaranteed by the United States, with boundaries set by treaty,
and in which the laws of foreign political entities do not seem to apply, with
limited exceptions, such as laws which would apply to a sovereign’s subject
when they were outside the sovereign’s domain.57
Thus while England had established plantations and colonies on lands
it had purchased or acquired from the Indian Nations by war, and the
United States had succeeded to those rights and claims, Indian Nations met
all the qualifications of members of the international community—
including recognition of their international capacity. This is the sense in
53. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561.
54. It is in the interests of the United States to recognize the capacity of Indian Nations to
enter into treaties and international agreements, as one of the two primary mechanisms by which
the United States claims a rightful interest in its territory is through purchases from the Indian
Nations. The other, of course, would have been territory seized in a just war—a form of seizure
which is apparently no longer acceptable to the international community.
55. Even after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, individual Indians are still not accorded natural born citizenship in the United States. Elk
v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884). Some individual Indians became citizens through treaty
provisions allowing naturalization. See, e.g., Treaty with the Seneca, Mixed Seneca and Shawnee,
Quapaw, Etc., art. 17, Feb. 23, 1867, Ratified June 18, 1868, Proclamation Oct. 14, 1868, 15 Stat.
513 (providing that this treaty also applied to: Confederated Peorias, Kaskaskias, Weas,
Piankeshaws, Ottawas of Blanchard’s Fork and Roche de Boeuf, and certain Wyandottes). Others
gained citizenship through allotment and other special procedures. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24
Stat. 388, P.L. 49-119. See also Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat.
253 (1923-1925) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2002)) (providing for the naturalization of all
Indians born in the United States at birth). For a listing of mechanisms by which Indians have
become naturalized citizens of the United States instead of, or in addition to, their citizenship in
their Indian Nation, see CHARLES J. KAPPLER, IV INDIAN AFFAIRS LAWS AND TREATIES 1, 1165
(1929).
56. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
57. See, e.g., Am. Fur Co. v. United States, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 358, 365 (1829); Worcester, 31
U.S. 561.
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which I suggest that while colonies had been established on these shores,
that as of 1832 when the last case in the Marshall trilogy58 had been
decided, Indian Nations had not been colonized, but rather continued to
exercise their inherent right of self-determination through the free pursuit of
their own social, cultural, and economic development, and the free development of their own legal and political systems59 subject only to the considerations that would obtain with any nation on whose borders a powerful,
belligerent, and imperialistic society threatened the peace and safety of the
people.
The distinction here is a fine one, but one which is important for a
vision of Indian Nations in a world which may yet see a declaration by the
General Assembly of the United Nations that Indigenous peoples, including
Indians, have the right of self-determination and to the integrity of their
territories.60 As late as 1832, Indian Nations satisfied the four conditions
for recognition as a State that would be codified by the International
community in the Convention on Rights and Duties of States signed at
Montevideo a little over one hundred years later on December 26, 1933.61
These conditions include: “a) a permanent population; b) a defined
territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the
other states.”62 The question is: since Indian Nations had international legal

58. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
59. See United States ex rel Mackey v. Cox, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100, 102 (1855) (explaining
that the Cherokee Nation developed tribal courts and formalized property and inheritance laws);
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (providing that the United States Constitution does not
apply to the Cherokee Nation’s governmental actions).
60. The right of self-determination in the International sense has little to do with selfdetermination contracts entered into between tribes and the United States pursuant to the Indian
Self-Determination Act. 25 U.S.C. § 450 (2000). These federal contracts are basically glorified
program management tools by which Indian tribes are allowed to operate—programs themselves
which would otherwise have been provided by the federal government. In contrast, the right of
self-determination in International law is expressed in Article 3 of the Draft Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the following form: “Indigenous peoples have the right of selfdetermination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development.” U.N. Draft Declaration, Part II, Art. 26, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/1/L.L (June 23, 2006). This right to “freely determine” and “freely pursue” includes
the concepts of political autonomy and territorial integrity, and is inconsistent with the imposition
of government by others. Id.
61. Convention between the United States of America and Other Republics on the Rights and
Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention] (Senate
advice and consent to ratification, with a reservation, June 15, 1934; Ratified by the President of
the United States, with a reservation, June 29, 1934; Ratification of the United States deposited
with the Pan American Union July 13, 1934; Entered into force December 26, 1934; Proclaimed
by the President of the United States January 18, 1935; Article 8 reaffirmed by protocol of
December 23, 1936; 49 Stat. 3097; Treaty Series 881).
62. Id. at art. I.
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capacity as States during the first third of the nineteenth century,63 how,
precisely, did each of them lose it between 1832 and 1933?64
It would seem that three of the four factors set out in the first Article of
the Montevideo Convention as indicators of statehood would be accepted as
retained by the Indian Nations to the present day with little, if any, controversy. Therefore, we shall deal in an admittedly summary fashion with the
issues respecting population, government, and contractual capacity.
As to whether the Indian Nations have a “permanent population” it is
an open and notorious fact the every federally recognized Indian tribe,
band, or nation, has a roll upon which is subscribed the names and
identifying information regarding its permanent population, or has specific
alternative methods of determining whether a given individual is a
“member” or “citizen” of that Nation.65 Although the United States has
63. I would suggest that nothing suggested here is inconsistent with the decision of the
Supreme Court in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831). While that case
declared that the Cherokee Nation was not a “foreign” state as that term is used in Article III of
the United States Constitution, that Court clearly held that the Cherokee Nation constituted a State
in the international sense, albeit a State which occupied a territory surrounded by the United
States, and against which the United States claimed as to other European colonial powers the
exclusive right to purchase from the Cherokee Nation.
64. Montevideo Convention, art. 4-5, 8, 11, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097. In 1933, the
United States, as party to this treaty, agreed to the following Articles in the Montevideo
Convention which would seem to thereafter preclude any claim of right to unilaterally extinguish
the international status of an Indian State:
ARTICLE 4
States are juridically equal, enjoy the same rights, and have equal capacity in their
exercise. The rights of each one do not depend upon the power which it possesses to
assure its exercise, but upon the simple fact of its existence as a person under
international law.
ARTICLE 5
The fundamental rights of states are not susceptible of being affected in any manner
whatsoever.
ARTICLE 8
No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.
ARTICLE 11
The contracting states definitely establish as the rule of their conduct the precise
obligation not to recognize territorial acquisitions or special advantages which have
been obtained by force whether this consists in the employment of arms, in threatening
diplomatic representations, or in any other effective coercive measure. The territory of
a state is inviolable and may not be the object of military occupation nor of other
measures of force imposed by another state directly or indirectly or for any motive
whatever even temporarily.
Id., available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/interam/intam03.htm. Of course, the
Charter of the United Nations would prohibit such acts after it came into force in 1945. Charter of
the United Nations, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2006). To
the extent that these provisions were a codification of the existing International norms, they were,
of course, in effect before 1933.
65. Mississippi Band of Choctaw v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989); Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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sometimes claimed unto itself the right to decide who comprises the tribal
membership—most always for the purpose of deciding to whom the United
States will make payment of certain debts it owes to the citizens of the
Indian Nation66—it is not generally disputed that the Indian Nations have
always had, and retain, the right to determine for themselves who their
citizens are.67 American law distinctly separates Indian citizens from nonIndians who are citizens pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the
American Constitution by virtue of being born or naturalized within the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.68 That division is seen
as a legal and political division—not a racial one—thus clearly
contradistinguishing Indian Nations from minority groups of American
citizens.69

66. 25 U.S.C. §§ 133, 163 (2000). “[I]n absence of express legislation by Congress to the
contrary, a tribe has the complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership, as a
political entity[,]” except where the question involved is distribution of tribal funds and other
property under supervision and control of the federal government. Martinez v. S. Ute Tribe of S.
Ute Reservation, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir. 1957) cert. den. 356 U.S. 960, reh. den. 357 U.S.
924.
67. Red Bird v. United States, 203 U.S. 76, 92 (1906); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49, 55 (1978).
68. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 101-02 (1884).
69. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-54 (1974). Because of tribal Constitutional
provisions and laws regarding eligibility for citizenship, it is possible for one to be a “fullblooded” Indian as a racial matter, yet not be eligible to be a citizen of any Indian Nation. It has
also been repeatedly recognized that persons who have no blood of the Indian race may be
admitted to naturalized citizenship in an Indian Nation, and thereby become entitled to such rights
and responsibilities as are extended by the Indian Nation to persons obtaining such status, and that
citizens of one Indian Nation may become naturalized citizens of another if the laws of the
receiving Indian Nation so allow. See Red Bird v. United States, 203 U.S. 76 (1906) (discussing
inter-married white persons); Allen v. Cherokee Nation Tribal Council, JAT-04-09, Judicial
Appeals Tribunal of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, available at http://www.
cherokeecourts.org/Portals/5/JAT-04-09%2054-Opinion%203-7-06.pdf (holding descendants of
the black freedmen are eligible for membership in the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma although
they have no Indian blood). This case also recognizes that some persons of Delaware and
Shawnee Indian blood are citizens of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma. Id. See also Treaty with
the Cherokees, art. 9, July 19, 1866, 14 Stat. 799 (Ratified July 27, 1866, Proclaimed August 11,
1866); Treaty with the Choctaws and Chickasaws, art. 3, 26, 30, Apr. 2, 1866, 14 Stat. 769
(Ratified June 28, 1866, Proclaimed July 10, 1866); Treaty with the Seminoles, art. 2, Mar. 21,
1866, 14 Stat. 755 (Ratified July 19, 1866, Proclaimed August 16, 1866). Indians are now
naturalized citizens of the United States at birth. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2000).
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In a similar way, the fact that Indian Nations retain functioning
governments 70 which are effectual is not open to serious dispute.71 In
199472 and again in 2000,73 Congress found that:
(1) the tribal right of self-government flows from the inherent
sovereignty of Indian tribes and nations;
(2) the United States recognizes a special government-to-government relationship with Indian tribes, including the right of the
tribes to self-governance, as reflected in the Constitution, treaties,
Federal statutes, and the course of dealings of the United States
with Indian tribes.74
The Executive Branch has also recognized the government-to-government
relationship between the United States and the Indian Nations.75 For the
United States to maintain a “government-to-government” relationship with
each federally recognized tribe requires, of course, that the tribe have a
government that is capable of entering into relations with other
governments.
Of course, the choice made by an Indian Nation to accept the
protection of the United States, or any other more powerful sovereign, does

70. See 25 U.S.C. § 476 (a) (2000) (acknowledging that all Indian Nations retain the inherent
sovereign authority to adopt constitutions and laws according to their own processes and
procedures). One should also note that the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
the Constitution of the United States does not operate of its own force upon the governments of
the Indian Nations. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163
U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
71. The Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior is required by federal law
to maintain a list of all Indian Nations recognized (i.e., maintaining a government-to-government
relationship) by the United States. 25 U.S.C. § 479(a)(1) (2000). In adopting this section,
Congress found that:
(1) the Constitution, as interpreted by Federal case law, invests Congress with plenary
authority over Indian Affairs;
(2) ancillary to that authority, the United States has a trust responsibility to recognized
Indian tribes, maintains a government-to-government relationship with those tribes,
and recognizes the sovereignty of those tribes;
(3) Indian tribes presently may be recognized by Act of Congress; by the
administrative procedures set forth in part 83 of the Code of Federal Regulations
denominated “Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an
Indian Tribe;” or by a decision of a United States court.
Id.
72. Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Act of Aug. 18, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106260, § 2, 114 Stat. 711.
73. Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 1994, Act of Oct. 25, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103413, § 202, 108 Stat 4250.
74. Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Act of Aug. 18, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106260, § 2, 114 Stat. 711.
75. See 65 F.R. 67249 (Nov. 6, 2000); 59 F.R. 22951 (Apr. 29, 1994), reprinted in 25 U.S.C.
§ 450, at 432-33 (2000).
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nothing to diminish the capacity of the Indian Nation to enter into, and
fulfill, agreements with other sovereigns.76 Likewise, the choice of the
United States to change its method of ratification of its contracts or agreements with Indian Nations in no way diminishes the capacity of Indian
Nations to enter into international agreements.77 Long after the end of the
classical “treaty period,”78 Indian Nations continued to make agreements
with the United States,79 and this practice has continued to the present
day.80 In addition, Congress has recently recognized that Indian Nations
76. In Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560-61 (1832), the Court said:
The very fact of repeated treaties with them recognizes [their capacity as a State in
international law]; and the settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker
power does not surrender its independence—its right to self government, by
associating with a stronger, and taking its protection. A weak state, in order to provide
for its safety, may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without
stripping itself of the right of government, and ceasing to be a state. Examples of this
kind are not wanting in Europe. “Tributary and feudatory states,” says Vattel, “do not
thereby cease to be sovereign and independent states, so long as self government and
sovereign and independent authority are left in the administration of the state.” At the
present day, more than one state may be considered as holding its right of self
government under the guarantee and protection of one or more allies.
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 560-61 (1832) (citations omitted).
77. In 1871, the United States chose to change the method of ratification of its agreements
with Indian Tribes, and no longer ratified them according to the treaty clause of the United States
Constitution. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 3, 16 Stat. 544, 570 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71
(2000)). That act did not claim to have any effect upon the capacity of an Indian Nation to
contract by treaty or otherwise with any sovereign other than the United States. Further, the
constitutionality of that statute is suspect. See G. William Rice, Indian Rights: 25 U.S.C. § 71:
The End of Indian Sovereignty or a Self-limitation of Contractual Ability?, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
239 (1977); Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause For Indian Tribes, 34
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 167 (2002).
78. After 1871, agreements between the United States and the Indian Nations were ratified
by Congressional action instead of by the Senate when the House of Representatives won a
political power struggle with the Senate by refusing to pay for the expenses of treaties ratified by
the Senate. See Clinton, supra note 77, at 167-68.
79. See, e.g., Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 813, § 1, 31 Stat. 672 (ratifying agreements with the
Indians of the Fort Hall Indian Reservation in Idaho and the Comanche, Kiowa and Apache
Indians of Oklahoma); Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 989 (ratifying agreements with the
Citizen Band Potawatomi, Cheyenne and Arapaho, Coeur d’Alene, the Tribes at Fort Berthold,
Sisseton and Wahpeton Sioux, and the Crow Tribe); Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 612,
(ratifying agreements with the Yakima and confederated tribes and bands, Cherokee, Tonkawas,
and Pawnees).
80. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 30, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-395, 92 Stat. 813 (1978) (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1715) (ratifying an agreement settling Indian land claims in the State of Rhode
Island); Act of Oct. 10, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-420, 94 Stat. 1785 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 17211735) (ratifying an agreement settling Indian land claims by the Passamaquoddy Tribe, the
Penobscot Nation, and the Maliseet Tribe within the State of Maine); Act of Dec. 31, 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-399, 96 Stat. 2012 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1741-1749) (ratifying an agreement settling
Indian land claims of the Miccosukee Indian Tribe in the State of Florida)); Act of Oct. 18, 1983,
Pub. L. No. 98-134, 97 Stat. 851 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1760) (ratifying an agreement
settling Indian land claims in the State of Connecticut); Act of Aug. 18, 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-95, 101 Stat. 704 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1771-1771-(a)-(j)) (ratifying an agreement settling
Indian land claims in the State of Massachusetts). Of course, the United States and Indian Nations
have made numerous contracts and agreements pursuant to the Indian Self-Determination and
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retain the authority to “enter into contracts and agreements to trade freely,
and seek enforcement of treaty and trade rights,” and has directed the
Secretary of Commerce to provide assistance to Indian Nations in doing so:
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—
(4) consistent with the principles of inherent tribal sovereignty
and the special relationship between Indian tribes and the
United States, Indian tribes retain the right to enter into contracts and agreements to trade freely, and seek enforcement of
treaty and trade rights;
....
(b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this Act are as follows:
(5) To encourage intertribal, regional, and international trade
and business development in order to assist in increasing
productivity and the standard of living of members of Indian
tribes and improving the economic self-sufficiency of the
governing bodies of Indian tribes.
(6) To promote economic self-sufficiency and political selfdetermination for Indian tribes and members of Indian
tribes.81
Finally, the United Nations has studied the circumstances and effect of
treaties and agreements between States and Indigenous peoples (Indian
Nations) and has concluded that such treaties and agreements are matters of
international concern,82 that they are enforceable according to their terms
subject to any defenses recognized by International law,83 and that they may
provide a useful tool for improving relations between Indigenous peoples
and member states of the United Nations.84 In that regard, Article 37 of the
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples calls on States to
recognize, observe, and enforce those treaties, agreements, and other

Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. 450-450(a)-(n), and the Indian Self-Governance Acts which
are enforceable contracts as between the Parties. Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 534 U.S.
631 (2005).
81. Native American Business Development, Trade Promotion, and Tourism Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-464, § 2, 114 Stat 2012, 2012-2013 (2000) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 4301(2000)).
82. 2006 U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 1, at 4 PP 13.
83. Id. at PP6.
84. See, e.g., U.N. Econ & Soc. Council [ECOSOC] Sub-Comm. on Prevention of
Discrimination & Protection of Minorities, Final Report: Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/20 (June 22, 1999) (prepared by Special Rapporteur Miguel
Alfonso Martinez); 2006 U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 1, at 5.
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constructive arrangements, and to honor and respect those agreements. 85
The provisions of the Draft Declaration contain at least seven additional
articles that require the free, prior, and informed consent of Indigenous
peoples to various State actions with respect to their lands, or provide for
Indigenous peoples taking action or entering into social, cultural, economic,
and political relationships with others across the current borders of member
States of the United Nations.86 Thus, the international community also contemplates future treaties and agreements by Indian Nations, and that they
will have international significance.
We are left, then, with the issue of territory, land, and resources. This
issue has not gone unnoticed, but has also been the subject of rather intense
study by the appropriate organs of the United Nations. In a 2001 report,
Special Rapporteur Mrs. Erica-Irene Daes recognized the distinctive spiritual and physical relationship between Indigenous peoples and the land, and
identified some of the reasons for the “urgent need to find solutions to the
long-standing problems that exist between Governments and indigenous
peoples”87 with respect to their land and resources:
122. Historically, [Indian] peoples in most parts of the world have
been deprived of their lands and resources in whole or in part
through many unjust processes, including military force, unlawful
settlements, forcible removal and relocation, legal fraud and illegal
expropriation by the Government.
124. One of the most widespread contemporary problems is the
failure of States to recognize the existence of [Indian] land use,
occupancy and ownership, and the failure to accord appropriate
legal status and legal rights to protect that use, occupancy or
ownership.
128. Such discriminatory doctrines include the doctrine of terra
nullius, the doctrine that [Indian] land title can be extinguished
without due process or compensation, the doctrine of ‘plenary
power’ and the doctrine that treaties with [Indian] peoples can be
violated or abrogated without any remedy.

85. 2006 U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 1, at 16.
86. Id. at 8, 11, 13, 14, 16.
87. Erica-Ilene A. Daes, U.N. Economic & Soc. Council, Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Indigenous Peoples and Minorities: <Indigenous Peoples and their relationship to
land>, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/20 (June 11, 1999).
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131. Claims processes that are improper, grossly unfair or fraudulent have been a severe problem for [Indian] peoples in certain
countries.
134. Other significant problems that have been identified are:
programmes to allot [Indian] lands to individuals; settlement programmes on [Indian] lands; the practice of requiring that [Indian]
land be held in trust by the State; programmes that use [Indian]
lands as collateral for loans; adverse management of sacred and
cultural sites by States; the failure of States and others to protect
the environmental integrity of [Indian] lands and resources; and
failure to accord [Indian] peoples an appropriate right to manage,
use and control development of their lands and resources.88
The application of these indictments to the situation of Indian Nations
within the United States is obvious. How came this to pass?
The germ of the American issue with regard to the territorial integrity
of Indian Nations is contained in the same early decisions which acknowledged the treaties drawing boundaries between the Indian Nations and the
United States. In the 1810 case of Fletcher v. Peck,89 the Court for the first
time faced an issue affected by Indian rights to land. In 1803, Peck had
conveyed to Fletcher a tract of land in Georgia. Among the warranties of
the deed were that the State, at the time of its initial conveyance to the
grantor’s predecessor in 1795, had the right to convey the fee-simple title to
the property, subject only to the Indians’ rights to occupancy of the land.90
After extensive analysis of non-Indian law issues raised by the demurrers to
the plaintiffs statements of his claims, the Court disposed of the question
that these two non-Indian parties had raised as follows: “The majority of the
court is of opinion that the nature of the Indian title, which is certainly to be
respected by all courts, until it be legitimately extinguished, is not such as
to be absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee on the part of the state.” 91
Foreshadowing things to come, Justice Johnson dissented. Justice Johnson
suggested both that Georgia’s claim of title, and the conceptual nature of
the “Indian title,” were too vague to arrive at a reasoned decision as to
whether a “fee-simple” title existed prior to purchase of the property from
the Indian Nations:

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 38-39.
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
Id. at 88.
Id. at 142-43.
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A fee-simple interest may be held in reversion, but our law will
not admit the idea of its being limited after a fee-simple. In fact, if
the Indian nations be the absolute proprietors of their soil, no other
nation can be said to have the same interest in it. What, then,
practically, is the interest of the states in the soil of the Indians
within their boundaries? Unaffected by particular treaties, it is
nothing more than what was assumed at the first settlement of the
country, to wit, a right of conquest, or of purchase, exclusively of
all competitors within certain defined limits.92
In Johnson v. M’Intosh, Justice Marshall first set out the doctrine of
discovery, approved its application to an inhabited place, and attempted to
convert the “discovery” of a place already inhabited into a lawful conquest
of the inhabitants.93 In Cherokee Nation, the Court declared that, although
the Cherokee Nation constituted a State in the international sense, politically and legally distinct and separate from both the United States and the
several states of the federal union, the Cherokee Nation was not a foreign
state entitled to bring an original action in the Supreme Court of the United
States under Article III of the Constitution of the United States because the
United States also asserted a “title” to the lands of the Cherokee Nation
arising under the doctrine of discovery.94 In Worcester 95 Justice Marshall

92. Id. at 146-47.
93. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). When reading this portion of the
opinion, one wonders whether Marshall had any intellectual confidence in the theory he was
propounding. It is noteworthy that he provided an alternative holding to support the result not
based upon discovery:
By the treaties concluded between the United States and the Indian nations, whose title
the plaintiffs claim, the country comprehending the lands in controversy has been
ceded to the United States, without any reservation of [the plaintiff’s] title. These
nations had been at war with the United States, and had an unquestionable right to
annul any grant they had made to American citizens. Their cession of the country,
without a reservation of this land, affords a fair presumption, that they considered it as
of no validity.
Id. at 593-94.
94. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). Again, Justice Marshall was
careful to provide a completely separate and distinct holding to support the outcome of the case,
namely that (regardless of the sufficiency of the theory or justice of the discovery doctrine):
“Foreign nations” is a general term, the application of which to Indian tribes, when
used in the American constitution, is, at best, extremely questionable. In one article, in
which a power is given to be exercised in regard to foreign nations generally, and to
the Indian tribes particularly, they are mentioned as separate, in terms clearly
contradistinguishing them from each other [the Commerce Clause of Art. I, § 8, cl. 3].
We perceive plainly, that the constitution, in this article, does not comprehend Indian
tribes in the general term “foreign nations;” not, we presume, because a tribe may not
be a nation, but because it is not foreign to the United States.
Id. at 19.
95. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542-43 (1832).
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vividly expressed the doctrine of discovery in terms of the English common
law as a title to the land and territories discovered as against other European
sovereigns:
The great maritime powers of Europe discovered and visited
different parts of this continent at nearly the same time. The object was too immense for any one of them to grasp the whole; and
the claimants were too powerful to submit to the exclusive or
unreasonable pretensions of any single potentate. To avoid bloody
conflicts, which might terminate disastrously to all, it was necessary for the nations of Europe to establish some principle which all
would acknowledge, and which should decide their respective
rights as between themselves. This principle, suggested by the
actual state of things, was, “that discovery gave title to the
government by whose subjects or by whose authority it was made,
against all other European governments, which title might be
consummated by possession.”
This principle, acknowledged by all Europeans, because it was the
interest of all to acknowledge it, gave to the nation making the
discovery, as its inevitable consequence, the sole right of acquiring
the soil and of making settlements on it. It was an exclusive principle which shut out the right of competition among those who had
agreed to it; not one which could annul the previous rights of those
who had not agreed to it. It regulated the right given by discovery
among the European discoverers; but could not affect the rights of
those already in possession, either as aboriginal occupants, or as
occupants by virtue of a discovery made before the memory of
man. It gave the exclusive right to purchase, but did not found that
right on a denial of the right of the possessor to sell.96
As the doctrine of Manifest Destiny97 gained ground beginning shortly
after the “Marshall trilogy,” and the military power of the United States
America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct people,
divided into separate nations, independent of each other and of the rest of the world,
having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their own laws. It is
difficult to comprehend the proposition, that the inhabitants of either quarter of the
globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of the other,
or over the lands they occupied; or that the discovery of either by the other should give
the discoverer rights in the country discovered, which annulled the pre-existing rights
of its ancient possessors.
Id. at 542-43.
96. Id. at 543-44 (citations omitted).
97. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Manifest Destiny, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Manifest_Destiny (last visited Sept. 30, 2006).
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gained the ascendency over the ability of Indian Nations to defend their
territories by resort to arms, the confounding of the concept of the private
fee-simple title of feudal tenure systems with the territorial dominion of
government resulted in confusion. For instance, one would think that an
individual who has purchased “the fee” from a state having the right of
preemption from a tribe would, after making a lawful purchase of the tribe’s
occupancy right with the authority of the federal government, be entitled to
maintain an action in ejectment for possession of the property against an
individual tribal member. One would be wrong.98 One would think that a
state, having conveyed its “fee-simple” subject to the Indians’ rights of
occupancy as was approved in Fletcher v. Peck, could thereafter levy and
collect a tax upon the right held by the “fee-title” holders. One would again
be wrong.99 One would think that if an Indian Nation acquired the “fee”
claimed by the original states or the United States by virtue of the discovery
doctrine (either directly or through those to whom the original possessor of
“the fee” had conveyed), then the right of the Indian Nation would again be
complete and all claims of ownership, right, and dominion would be vested
in the Indian Nation. One would again be wrong.100
Given this confusion, and the language of Marshall’s Cherokee Nation
opinion describing the relationship between the Indian Nations and the
United States as resembling the relation between a ward and a guardian,101
and the declining military power of many Indian Nations, it is not surprising

The phrase ‘Manifest Destiny’ was first used primarily by Jackson Democrats in the
1840s to promote the annexation of much of what is now the Western United States
(the Oregon Territory, the Texas Annexation, and the Mexican Cession). The term was
revived in the 1890s, this time with Republican supporters, as a theoretical
justification for U.S. expansion outside of North America. The term fell out of usage
by U.S. policy makers early in the 20th century, but some commentators believe that
aspects of Manifest Destiny, particularly the belief in an American “mission” to
promote and defend democracy throughout the world, continued to have an influence
on American political ideology.
Id.
98. Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 366 (1856).
99. In re New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1866). It was also held that the authority
of the state to tax was inapplicable to individual Indian citizens of a tribe who held their land in
fee under the terms of a treaty with the United States. In re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737,
(1866).
100. Under Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty with the Cherokees, 7 Stat. 478, Proclamation May
23, 1836, the United States sold the fee simple and ceded by patent the lands conveyed to the
Cherokee Nation pursuant to several treaties. Although a cession of lands from a tribe to the
United States eliminates all claims by the tribe, a cession from the United States to a tribe
apparently has no such effect according to the United States Supreme Court. United States v.
Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846); United States ex rel Mackey v. Cox, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100
(1855); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870). In the modern context, see City of
Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
101. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831)
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that the words of the treaties and court decisions seized more and more
upon the language of trust titles and dependency, and less of dividing lines
and borders. Thus, a few of the treaties during the latter portion of the
classical treaty era begin to speak of the United States holding land “in
trust” for the Indian Nations or their citizens.102 Notions that the United
States really “owned” the land, and only “allowed” the Indians to live upon
it became more acceptable as the United States began to consider further
expansion of its claims of governance into the territory of the Indian Nation
after cases like the Cherokee Tobacco.103 Most treaties, however, still did
not speak of the United States holding lands “in trust” for Indian Nations,
but in the “reservation” or “setting apart” of lands for the use of the Indian
Nations. The language of “trust” status during the treaty era seems to be
reserved mainly to monies received for the sale of tribal lands, and of the
United States holding lands “in trust” for individual allottees, non-Indians
who were granted land by the terms of a treaty, and lands which were to be
sold by the United States to settlers with the money being finally paid to the
United States for the benefit of the Tribe.
When Crow Dog killed Spotted Tail within the territory of the Great
Sioux Nation, the Lakota people resolved the matter according to their own
laws as they had always done. Spotted Tail was, however, a favorite of the
Americans, and the United States Attorney filed murder charges against
Crow Dog in the territory of Dakota. When the United States Supreme
Court decided that Crow Dog could not be hung by the federal government,104 Congress immediately responded by enacting the Major Crimes
Act.105 This act, approved by the Court in United States v. Kagama,106
regardless of the inability of the Court to find a constitutional basis for the
authority of Congress to enact it, marks the beginning of the colonization of
the territory of the Indian tribes—i.e., the first significant attempt by the

102. Treaty with the Senecas, Mixed Senecas and Shawnees, Quapaws, arts. 16, 20, Feb. 23,
1867, 15 Stat. 513; Treaty with the Delawares, July 2, 1861, 12 Stat. 1177 (requiring that if
purchase money was not paid, land had to be returned to United States in trust for the tribe);
Treaty with the Senecas, Tonawanda Band, art. 3, 11 Stat. 735; 12 Stat. 991, November 5, 1857
(authority to repurchase lands from the holder of “the fee” who had previously purchased the
Indian title).
103. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870).
104. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
105. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362 (codified as amended at 818 U.S.C.
§ 1153 (2000)).
106. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). The Court expressly disclaimed the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause as the font of Congressional power to enact the
Major Crimes Act. Id. at 378. Instead, the Court simply asserted a broad political sovereignty
over the Indian Nations and their territory. Id. at 378-84.
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United States to subvert the authority of the Indian Nations in their own
territory by application of federal laws without their consent.107
Congress was not slow to follow up on the Court’s invitation to directly
govern Indian Nations and their territories, thereby expanding the treatment
of the Indian territory as internal colonies of the United States whose
resources were to be expropriated for the benefit of Americans.108 In 1887,
Congress adopted the General Allotment Act which, for the first time,
demanded the substitution of American real property and inheritance109 law
for that of the Indian Nations, authorized the President of the United States
to unilaterally divide the tribal domain amongst the individual citizens of
the Tribe, and thereby create a “surplus” of tribal land that the tribe could
be pressured to sell.110 The United States used this Act to present the tribes
with a stark choice—be allotted under the act without your consent, or enter
into an “agreement” with the United States and receive slightly larger
allotments (i.e. save a little more land before the balance is sold).111 By
1903, even this possibility was effectively eliminated when the United
States Supreme Court announced that the authority of Congress over tribal
property had become “plenary” and that there was no need for Congress to
obtain a tribe’s consent before their land and resources were seized by the
United States to be given to non-Indians.112
The results were devastating.113 As a result of the General Allotment
Act and federal policy of allotment, Indian land holdings plunged from 138
million acres in 1887 to 48 millions acres by 1934. Fractionation of Indian
interests as individual allotments were inherited by the decedents of the
allottees pursuant to state inheritance laws resulted in tracts of land that
were unusable by the owners.114 Colonialist treatment of Indian Nations
and their territories became ingrained into the “normal” relationship
between the federal government and the Indian Nations. With few
107. Clinton, supra note 16, at 83-98.
108. See generally Clinton, supra note 16.
109. United States ex rel Mackey v. Cox, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1855); Jones v. Meehan,
175 U.S. 1 (1899).
110. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
111. See, e.g , Act of Mar. 3, 1891, § 13, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 989 (Cheyenne-Arapaho
Allotment Agreement); Act of Feb. 13, 1891, art. II, ch. 165, 26 Stat. 749 (Sac and Fox).
112. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). The only limitation imposed by the
Court’s opinion was that contained in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution –
that the Congress could not confiscate the land, but must pay its reasonable value. However, the
Court left the determination of the reasonable value of the property to Congress, and, Congress
held the payment “in trust” for the tribe in the treasury of the United States.
113. See generally E. CAHN, OUR BROTHER’S KEEPER: THE INDIAN IN WHITE AMERICA
(1969).
114. Id. See also, Allotment: Frequently Asked Questions, How Many Tribes, http://www.
indianlandtenure.org/ILTFallotment/FAQs/faqsI.htm# (last visited Sept. 20, 2006).

836

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 82:811

exceptions,115 Congress claimed the authority to govern the Indian country
without even a nod toward securing the consent of the governed—even to
the extent of allowing states to exercise authority over Indians and their
territories, unilaterally terminating the political relationship with some
Indian Nations,116 and unilaterally limiting tribal powers of selfgovernment.117 Eventually, the Supreme Court held that the “aboriginal
title,” that early cases described as superior to any claim by the United
States, could be confiscated by the United States without even the
semblance of compensation.118
Since this nadir, some things have begun to improve. The Congress
has rejected the allotment policy119 and the termination era in no uncertain
terms. Congress has replaced these failed policies with a policy promoting
tribal self-determination120 and self-governance.121 For the first time in almost a hundred years, the Congress has acted to expressly reject a Supreme
Court Indian law decision promoting colonial treatment of Indian governments, and the theory upon which it was based.122 The Supreme Court,
however, seems determined to continue to impose these now discredited
theories of allotment, assimilation, and domination, and has actively set out
to limit tribal powers of self-determination, and the territory for the exercise

115. Two important exceptions were the Wheeler-Howard Indian Reorganization Act of June
18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (IRA); and the Thomas-Rodgers Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of
June 26, 1936, ch. 831, 49 Stat. 1967 (OIWA), both of which required tribal consent before all or
some of their provisions were applicable to any particular tribe. This feature would not again be
seen for decades.
116. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified in part as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000)); Act of Aug. 13, 1954, ch. 732, 68
Stat. 718 (Klamath, Modoc, and the Yahooskin Band of Snake Indians) (now restored as Act of
Aug. 27, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-398, § 2, 100 Stat. 849).
117. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301
(2000))
118. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
119. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), repealed by Act of Nov. 7, 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-462, Title I, § 106(a)(1), 114 Stat. 2007. Sections 1 and 2 of the WheelerHoward Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, had prohibited further
allotment of tribal lands, and extended indefinitely the periods of protection (trust status) of the
allotted lands of individuals of the tribes who chose to have that act apply.
120. 25 U.S.C. § 450 (2000).
121. Act of Oct. 25, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, § 202, 108 Stat 4250; Act of Aug. 18, 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-260, § 2, 114 Stat. 711.
122. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (recognizing that Congress had
“changed the applicable law” of its prior decision in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) by the
Act of Oct. 28, 1991, 105 Stat. 646 (now codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)). The significance of the
Congressional rejection of the Court’s practice of imposing judicially created limits upon tribal
rights of self-determination because the Court viewed those rights as “inconsistent with the status”
of the Indian Nations seems to have been lost upon the Court. This is the first such action by
Congress since the Court’s reasoning in In Re Heff, 197 U.S. 488 (1905) was rejected by statute.
See United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
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of tribal self-determination.123 One wonders if the Court will get the
message from Congress.
That the treatment of Indian territories as internal colonies of the
United States continues—primarily by action of the Court—is well
recognized by the commentators.124 However, as one scholar has noted,
there is no Supremacy Clause applicable to the Indian Nations.125 The
United States Constitution does not limit the powers of government of the
Indian Nations.126 The application of federal law to Indian Nations absent
their continuing consent remains a naked imposition of power, and is
violative of every American principal of legitimate government, and
currently effective international principals of relations between States. It
matters not from the perspective of the recipient whether that power is
exerted by uniforms of the military, the police, or the judiciary. That such
treatment is unjust and violative of the International law expressed by
Justice Marshall’s early decisions, the principles of which were codified in
the plain text of the Montevideo Convention, the Charter of the United
Nations, and various international human rights instruments is patently
obvious.127

123. See, e.g., City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197 (2005); Nevada
v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); Strate v. A1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993); County of
Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992); Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989);
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989);
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.
191 (1978).
124. See supra notes 18 and 19. See also Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian
Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31 (1996); Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme
Court’s Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641 (2003); Allison M. Dussias,
Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme
Court’s Changing Vision, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1993); Robert Laurence, Unseemly Nature of
Reservation Diminishment by Judicial, As Opposed to Legislative, Fiat and the Ironic Role of the
Indian Civil Rights Act in Limiting Both, 71 N.D. L. REV. 393 (1995); Clinton, supra note 16, at
83, 98; L. Scott Gould, Tough Love For Tribes: Rethinking Sovereignty After Atkinson and Hicks,
37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 669 (2003) (advocating that Indian Tribes abandon their reliance on
inherent sovereignty and the treaty promises of the United States and accept the domination of the
United States as limitations on their right of self-determination in order to survive.)
125. Clinton, supra note 77, at 167.
126. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 30 (1831) (Johnson, J., concurring);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 544 (1832); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384
(1895); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978).
127. ORGANIZATION OF AM. STATES, INTER-AMERICAN COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS: No.
113/01, Case No. 11.140, Dann v. United States (2000), available at http://www.utulsa.edu/law/
classes/rice/INTERAMER_COMM_HUMAN_RTS_Dann_Sisters_US.htm (discussing wrongful
extinguishment of western Shoshone aboriginal title). See also Mabo and Others v. Queensland
(No. 2) [1992] HCA 23; (1992) 175 CLR 1 F.C. 92/014 (3 June 1992) (Australia), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1992/23.html (on file with the author).
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Through it all, most Indian Nations have retained the treaty boundaries
of their reserved lands and territories intact even under these tender
ministrations of the federal government.128 Those Indian Nations where the
United States claims to have extinguished129 or diminished130 their
reservations since their last treaty with the United States generally retain an
area (often a “diminished reservation” or the “former reservation”) which is
formally recognized by the federal administration as the area within which
their governmental authorities, programs, and services function.131 There
are, however, a few Indian Nations who do not have any territorial area
recognized by the United States as their own. Almost all suffer from the
legacy of allotment which has resulted in individual citizens of the Indian
Nation as well as outsiders holding lands within the tribal territory rights to
which are governed by American law.132 Only a few have not suffered the
devastation of allotment.
If we are to move forward past the process of accusation and denial
toward achievement in practice of the lofty ideals contemplated by the
founders of America, the United Nations, and those who promote and
defend human rights, we must recognize that we have now a unique
opportunity to begin the resolution of America’s colonial situation. We
exist in a time when the United States Congress, the President, the United
Nations, and the leadership in the Indian Nations uniformly state that they
intend for the Indian Nations to have and exercise their rights of selfdetermination and self-governance—even if they all mean slightly different
things by these words. Consider then the possibilities. If the Draft
Declaration is approved by the General Assembly, the Declaration will
become a gauge against which the actual state of things in the Indian

128. See Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 506 (1973); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S.
351, 357-58 (1962); United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 284 (1909); United States v. Nice,
241 U.S. 591, 601 (1916) (discussing allottees).
129. See, e.g., DeCoteau v. District Court, 420 U.S. 425, 428 (1975).
130. See, e.g., Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421 (1994).
131. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 4702(11) (2000) (Community Development Banking and
Financial Institutions); 16 U.S.C. § 1722(6)(C) (2000) (Public Lands Corps); 23 U.S.C.
§ 202(d)(2)(G)(ii)(IV) (2000) (Indian Reservation Roads); Act of July 7, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-188, 112 Stat. 620, as amended by Act of Oct. 6, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-67, § 1(2), 113 Stat.
979 (“Former Indian Reservations in Oklahoma” included in definition of “Indian land” subject to
mineral leasing); 25 U.S.C. § 1452(d) (2000) (Financing Economic Development of Indians and
Indian Organizations); 25 U.S.C. § 2010(d) (2000) (Bureau of Indian Affairs Education Funding);
25 U.S.C. § 3103(12) (2000) (National Indian Forest Resources Management); 25 U.S.C.
§ 3202(9) (2000) (Indian Child Protection and Family Violence Prevention); 25 U.S.C. § 3653(2)
(2000) (Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance).
132. Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 17-18 (1995); Mark D.
Poindexter, Of Dinosaurs and Indefinite Land Trusts: A Review of Individual American Indian
Property Rights Amidst the Legacy of Allotment, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 53 (1994).
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Country may be compared. The United States has the opportunity to once
again move into the forefront as a champion of human rights by actively
putting the principles of the Declaration into practice, thus showing the way
to the rest of the international community.133 Given the nature of the
Declaration and the situation of the Indian Nations in the United States, this
could be done as a process without significant disruption of private rights.
It has been suggested that the heart of the Declaration is contained in
Article 3, which recognizes the right of self-determination. Contained
within the right of self-determination is the right to have a place in which
the people of the Indian Nation may “freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”134 In
other words, the first principle that they must obtain in order to rectify the
historical suppression of the rights of the Indian Nations is that they are,
each of them, entitled to a homeland. For most Indian Nations, the
boundaries of their homeland are set out in treaties between their Nation
and the United States, or in other governmental action which recognizes the
territorial area which they have traditionally occupied and used.135
In the circumstances of Indian Nations having treaties, agreements, or
other constructive arrangements with the United States, the Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provides:
Article 37
1. [Indian] peoples have the right to the recognition, observance
and enforcement of Treaties, Agreements and Other Constructive
Arrangements concluded with [the United] States or their
successors and to have [the United] States honour and respect such
Treaties, Agreements and other Constructive Arrangements.

133. It does not really matter in this context whether the United States “supports” the
Declaration or would ratify a subsequent Convention incorporating all or some of the principles of
the Declaration. The only relevant question for our purposes is whether the United States will
actually abide by those principles with respect to the Indian Nations existing as enclaves within its
borders.
134. 2006 U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 1, at 6.
135. For those to whom United States law ascribes no home, it is suggested that the proper
solution would be a negotiated agreement whereby the Indian Nation would purchase from the
U.S. ($1.00 per acre being the usual historical price) public lands of the United States within the
aboriginal homeland of the Indian Nation. The parties could also stipulate for an area within
which the Indian Nation would be authorized to acquire private lands from private owners, and
upon payment of the purchase price, those lands would attach to and become a part of the
homeland of the Indian Nation.

840

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 82:811

2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as to diminish or
eliminate the rights of [Indian] Peoples contained in Treaties,
Agreements and Constructive Arrangements.136
In many cases, the terms of such documents will, to the satisfaction of both
parties, set out the territorial area for the exercise of the Indian Nation’s
rights once they are agreed to be recognized, observed, and enforced.
However, it is useful here to mention a point, and that is the action to take
upon the development of a controversy regarding the validity or interpretation of any such treaty, agreement, or constructive arrangement. Certainly, it should be that neither party should be heard to retain the benefits
of such contracts, and yet deny the other party the benefit of their bargain.
Likewise, it is a principle too ingrained in fundamental fairness at both the
domestic and international level to need mention that one is not a valid
judge of their own cause. Therefore, a second principle that must be laid
down is that in the event of a disagreement concerning the validity, interpretation, or implementation of a contact between the parties, the matter
must be referred to a neutral third party decision maker and a fair
process.137
If this resolution mechanism is instituted with the consent of both
parties, then neither party to the controversy may have continuing cause for
complaint after the negotiated resolution of the matter, the rendition of a
judgment, or whatever agreed resolution is forthcoming. Unless the United
States agrees to submit its rights under treaties and agreements to the
dispute resolution forums of the Indian Nation(s) interested in that treaty or
agreement to abide the result, how can it demand that the Indian Nations
submit their rights under those documents to a court of the United States?
Of course my courts, staffed by my officers, and applying my laws will do
justice to you.
Let us find a mutually agreeable solution to the interpretation of these
contracts so that these contractual obligations can be fulfilled in an honest
and transparent manner. Many models exist from which to chose. There
are, of course, the traditional international forums such as the International
Court of Justice,138 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and others.

136. 2006 U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 1, at 16.
137. For instance, some tribes view attempts by the United States to pay compensation to
tribes through mechanisms such as the Indian Claims Commission as, at best, an interim payment
of rent for lands wrongfully taken, and, at worst, another method of confiscation since the tribes
involved never had the option to regain their land. See section 70, of the Act of August 13, 1946,
ch. 959, § 1, 60 Stat. 1049, which established the Indian Claims Commission. The Commission
terminated on Sept. 30, 1978.
138. Created by Chapter 14 of the Charter of the United Nations.
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In addition, there are various arbitration models, such as that provided by
the World Bank for investors in developing countries, as well as institutions
such as the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues of ECOSOC,139 which
could, perhaps, serve as a model for the development of an agreed dispute
resolution mechanism that would be satisfactory to both parties. There also
now exist a number of internationally known experts with human rights and
indigenous peoples experience who could serve as facilitators, mediators, or
arbitrators in their personal capacities. Regardless of the choices made, if
Indian Nations and the United States are ever going to resolve the issues
regarding the treaty commitments between them, a good faith dispute
resolution process must be developed that is transparent, satisfactory to both
parties, and controlled by neither.
Of course, an additional consideration would be the negotiation and
ratification of new treaties. The provision by which the United States ended
the classical treaty era is constitutionally suspect,140 but that is not the most
compelling reason to revitalize treaty making with the Indian Nations. It
would seem that the natural process for Indian Nations to give free, prior,
and informed consent to State action, and by which the United States would
accept such consent or give consent to Tribal action (as is done, for instance
with reallocation of funds under self-governance compacts), would generally be in the form of a contract between the sovereigns, or as a diplomatic
note in furtherance of an agreement already made. In order to avoid the
issues provided by the Lone Wolf decision and the legacy that the plenary
power doctrine has left to us, it would seem useful to make sure that agreements respecting agreed resolutions of issues respecting former treaties and
agreements, as well as mutually beneficial agreements for the future, should
be carefully conceived and structured so as to guarantee that they are
mutually acceptable before they are considered binding. One way to go
about this is by compliance with the internationally known and respected
rules of treaties. The concerns of the House of Representatives that led to
the statutory ban on treaty making could be addressed by having the
funding for each treaty be approved by an act of Congress prior to its negotiation. Alternatively, agreements could be denominated as a “convention,”
or by some other term for an instrument which requires mutual consent for
its validity, but it must clearly not be done in a unilateral manner which will
return to the troubles of the past.

139. The Economic and Social Council, created by Chapter 10 of the Charter of the United
Nations.
140. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2000). How can the legislative branch prohibit the treaty-making
branch from exercising its constitutional function?
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Once agreement is reached concerning the boundary between the
United States and an Indian Nation by negotiation or a dispute resolution
process, the next issue of moment will be the consolidation of the lands
within that territory into Indian title.141 The United States has passed
several statutes for the purpose of Indian land consolidation, but it is
apparent that the federal government has something different in mind than
do tribal leaders. Reviewing the land consolidation acts adopted by the
federal government reveals that by and large they are designed to reduce
fractionated heirship of allotted trust and restricted properties to the point
that each such property may be beneficially used or to return such lands to
tribal ownership.142 Tribal leaders who think about Indian land consolidation, however, usually are thinking about how to reacquire ownership of
all lands within the reservation—and primarily those which are held by
non-Indians. Thus, there seems to be a disconnect between the goals of the
Interior Department and the goals of tribal leadership. Neither goal is
necessarily bad, but they are different.
Again, the Draft Declaration can be looked to for guidance. At Article
28, it provides:
Article 28
1. [Indian] peoples have the right to redress, by means that can
include restitution or, when this is not possible, of a just, fair and
equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and resources
which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or
used, and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or
damaged without their free, prior and informed consent.
2. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned,
compensation shall take the form of lands, territories and resources
equal in quality, size and legal status or of monetary compensation
or other appropriate redress.143
By the provisions of this article, three principles emerge. First, there is a
right of redress, for all lands confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged

141. It should be noted that within the Indian Land Consolidation Act, the concept of an
approved land consolidation plan could also be modified to provide a useful tool for the agreed
establishment of a territorial base for tribes which have none, tribes whose territorial base is
demonstrably too small for their reasonable development, and circumstances where a tribe needs
to obtain access to sites in its traditional homeland for religious, ceremonial, or other purposes due
to its removal to a different location, or in the situation where a tribe desires to remove from its
present location for the purpose of returning to the original homeland from which it has been
removed. 25 U.S.C. § 2203 (2000).
142. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2307 (2000).
143. 2006 U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 1, at 13.
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without the free, prior and informed consent of the Indian Nation
concerned. Second, that redress should include restitution of the land taken
to the greatest extent possible. For many Indian tribes, land is not a
fungible resource to be acquired and disposed of for the purpose of profit.
Third, barring the free, prior, and informed consent of the Indian Nation to
the contrary, the right of compensation should take the form of replacement
lands, territories, and resources of equal quality, size, and legal status of the
lands which cannot be returned, or for damages that cannot otherwise be
remedied. In other words, if the United States or one of its political subdivisions is going to condemn lands of an Indian Nation, then “just
compensation” as that term is used in the Fifth Amendment, should be
interpreted to mean equivalent lands which the acquiring governmental
entity should condemn from its own citizens (with full payment in money,
of course) in order to make restitution to the tribe in land. Only in a
circumstance where this “exchange” of land is made freely available as an
option for the tribe, would a payment of money in lieu of land be ethically
satisfactory as a freely chosen option by the Indian Nation.
These considerations take our discussion back to the land consolidation
issue—from the tribal perspective. Regardless of the merits of the various
arguments concerning the legitimacy of the allotment process in toto, its
application in particular, or the agreements negotiated in lieu of allotment
under the General Allotment Act, tribal leaders seek a method of reacquisition of lands within their tribe’s territorial areas that is transparent, reasonably simple, and not subject to inordinate delays through withholding or
denial of administrative action. The free development and redevelopment
of tribal economies, social, and cultural systems all depend primarily upon
having a land base within the tribe’s exclusive jurisdiction.
Tribes to whom the Indian Reorganization Act applies, and who have
obtained a federal charter of incorporation including the right to “purchase,
take by gift, or bequest, or otherwise, own, hold, manage, operate, and dispose of”144 lands may, of course, do so, and it appears from the fourth
paragraph of Section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA)145 that all
such lands shall be taken (by the tribe’s approval process) in the name of
the United States in trust for the tribe,146 and that such land shall be exempt
from state and local taxation.147 The authorizing statute states:
144. 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2000).
145. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2000).
146. This is similar to the authority vested in the Tennessee Valley Authority, another
federally chartered corporation, to acquire land which will then be held by the United States for
the TVA and operated subject to the authority of the TVA. 16 U.S.C. § 831c(h).
147. Id.; Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
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The Secretary of the Interior may, upon petition by any tribe, issue
a charter of incorporation to such tribe: Provided, That such
charter shall not become operative until ratified by the governing
body of such tribe. Such charter may convey to the incorporated
tribe the power to purchase, take by gift, or bequest, or otherwise,
own, hold, manage, operate, and dispose of property of every
description, real and personal, including the power to purchase
restricted Indian lands and to issue in exchange therefore interests
in corporate property, and such further powers as may be incidental to the conduct of corporate business, not inconsistent with law,
but no authority shall be granted to sell, mortgage, or lease for a
period exceeding twenty-five years any trust or restricted lands
included in the limits of the reservation. Any charter so issued
shall not be revoked or surrendered except by Act of Congress.148
This provision, once activated in a charter, if it is accepted at face value by
the courts,149 authorizes tribal land acquisition without further approval by
the Interior Department subject to any limitations expressed in the Charter,
authorizes the acquisition of trust and restricted Indian lands, and authorizes
the tribe to issue “interests in corporate property” in exchange for land.
Presumptively, a tribe could revive or create its own land tenure system,
and the patent to be issued under tribal law would be the “interest in
corporate property” which would be exchanged for the title to the property
acquired. Lands within the reservation, once acquired, could not be sold
(presumptively absent consent of Congress in a later statute) in any manner
which was cognizable in state or federal law, although conveyances
pursuant to tribal law would be unaffected.
Such an acquisition would also, apparently, render such properties
Indian Country as they would have been acquired with the approbation of
Congress and the Executive branch.150 However, these provisions may not
be available to tribes who excluded themselves from the IRA pursuant to
that Act,151 and the Osage, who are expressly precluded from both the IRA
and the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act (OIWA).152 This is also an
148. 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2000).
149. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
150. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Okla. Tax Comm’n v.
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
151. The Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 18, 48 Stat. 988 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 478
(2000)), allowed tribes to exclude themselves from the Act. The election was to be called within
two years after enactment of the statute, and there does not appear to be any mechanism for a tribe
who voted against the Act to accept its application now.
152. See Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 13, 48 Stat. 986 (amended by the Act of May 24,
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-301, § 3(b), 104 Stat. 207, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 473 (2000)). Although
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extremely important provision given the anecdotal reluctance of the
Secretary of the Interior to accept additional lands into trust for Indian
tribes and individuals due to the Cobell litigation.153 This case, which has
been pending for many years, requests an accounting for years of federal
mismanagement of Indian trust assets, both real and personal. Of course, if
the Secretary holds, or chooses to acquire trust properties pursuant to the
first paragraph of section 5 of the IRA,154 his/her trust responsibilities are
extensive. On the other hand, when the tribe places property in trust pursuant to its authority under section 17 of the IRA 155 and its charter, the trust
responsibility of the United States is extremely limited as set out in that
section.
All tribes should have the authority to reacquire the lands within their
territorial boundaries,156 they should thereafter have exclusive jurisdiction
to tax such lands and to control the laws pursuant to which such lands are to
be used. Application of these provisions to all tribes could begin the process by which a partial right of redress is extended to all tribes pursuant to
Article 27 of the Draft Declaration. Express recognition of the authority of
all tribes to acquire lost lands within their territorial boundaries in the open
market, that such lands are exempt from state and local taxation, that private
interests and the income earned from those lands would be exempt from
state and local taxation (as are allotted lands), that all interests in such lands
thereafter would be governed exclusively by the laws of the tribe, and that
all conveyances, leases, probates and other matters respecting such lands
would be matters of exclusive tribal concern to be resolved exclusively in
the tribal forums, could be a form of redress under Article 28 of the Draft
Declaration that could be attractive to the United States, the Indian Nations,
and individual landowners within the territories of tribal interest. Since the
this section provided that certain named sections of the IRA (including 25 U.S.C. § 477, but not
including 25 U.S.C. § 465) did not apply to a list of named tribes in Oklahoma, the Act of June 26,
1936, ch. 831, § 3, 49 Stat. 1967 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 503), authorized the Secretary of the
Interior to issue a charter to those same tribes in Oklahoma, which charter could convey to that
tribe all the powers which § 13 of the IRA denied. See Sac and Fox Nation v. Norton, No. CIV05-1234-R, Slip Op. (W.D. Okla., Sept. 15, 2006). However, the Osage tribe was precluded from
obtaining a charter under said § 503 by § 8 of the OIWA, 25 U.S.C. § 508 (2000).
153. Cobell v. Kempthorne, No. 1:96CV01285 (D.D.C.) (pending).
154. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2000).
155. 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2000).
156. The United States has long recognized the right of tribes to exercise the power of
condemnation over Indian property within the tribal territory whether a tribal assignment of land,
or an allotment held by the United States for an individual Indian. Sol. Op. M-27810, December
13, 1934, reprinted in I Opinions of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior Relating to
Indian Affairs 1917-1974, 484 (Question 9) (USGPO). Although this opinion assumes that Indian
Nations cannot condemn the property of non-Indians, no rational reason is presented in support of
that assumption. Given a payment of just compensation, no reasoned exception seems to be
justified.
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state and local governments would no longer be responsible for provision of
services on such lands, it would seem that any claim they continued to
promote respecting taxation or jurisdiction over such lands would be
without merit. Finally, there would be nothing which would preclude a
tribe entering into appropriate agreements either to provide or receive
services relative to other governments, and to pay or receive compensation
for the same. Treating the restitution of tribal lands as a process seems to
be a method of resolving some of the issues of land rights to the satisfaction
of all relevant parties.
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Epilogue:
At the General Assembly of the United Nations this fall, the
representative of the Island State of Tuvalu made the following statement:
Joining the United Nations at the dawn of the new century for my
small island nation is a statement of hope. Hope that by the noble
ideals and principles of this Great Body, and despite our physical
remoteness and insignificance, Tuvalu will be allowed to paddle
its canoe in harmony along with super-tankers and share the
common future of a world of larger freedom: a world in which
every State regardless of its size is recognized of its sovereignty,
independence, and human rights.157
The fifteen smallest countries in the world are:158
Rank

Country

Sq. Miles

Population

1.

Vatican City

0.2

770

2.

Monaco

0.7

30,000

3.

Nauru

8.5

10,000

4.

Tuvalu

10

12,100

5.

San Marino

24

25,000

6.

Liechtenstein

62

29,000

7.

Marshall Islands

70

52,000

8.

St. Kitts & Nevis

104

41,000

9.

Seychelles

107

69,000

10.

Maldives

115

181,000

11.

Malta

122

362,000

12.

Grenada

133

98,000

13.

St. Vincent

133

109,000

& the Grenadines
14.

Barbados

166

260,000

15.

Antigua & Barbuda

171

83,000

157. Statement by His Excellency Mr. Enele Sosene Sopoaga, Ambassador / Permanent
Representative of Tuvalu to the United Nations as a part of the General Debate of the 61st United
Nations General Assembly, Sept. 27, 2006, http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/61/pdfs/tuvalu-e.pdf
(last visited Sept. 28, 2006). Tuvalu’s “population of 11,636 (est. 2005) live on Tuvalu’s nine
atolls, which have a total land area of 10 square miles, or 27 square kilometres [about 6,400
acres]. This ranks Tuvalu as the fourth smallest country in the world, in terms of land area.”
Tuvalu’s Homepage, http://www.tuvaluislands.com/about htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
158. Official Tuvalu Website, http://www.tuvaluislands.com/small-tv.htm (last visited Sept.
28, 2006).
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The small reservation on which I reside would be too large to be listed
here. It contains approximately 750 square miles.159
Perhaps one day, an Indian tribal State, as a dependant enclave within
the United States, will be able to stand with the representative of Tuvalu,
and compare our paddles before we address the General Assembly.

159. Treaty with the Sauk and Foxes, Article VI, Feb. 18, 1867, 15 Stat. 495 (Ratified July
25, 1868, Proclaimed Oct. 14, 1868).

